We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the
extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' …

Gallice and Monzón (Econ J 129 (621): 2137–2154, 2019) present present a natural
environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite …

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzón (2019) to incorporate a public goods game
with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are …

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in
a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample …

We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose
her action set from a menu of options. We fully characterize for a large class of settings the …

We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational
learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based …

We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational
learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based …

We design an experiment to study the implications of introducing position uncertainty in a
one-shot social dilemma where eight players decide to contribute to a public good …

This paper explores a two-player game in which actions are imperfectly observed and
players are uncertain about move order. We study two examples, a “commitment” example …

I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at
which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a …