We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the
college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. These constraints often
take the form of restrictions on the numbers of agents on one side of the market matched to …

This chapter focuses on criteria and methods for ranking subsets of a set of objects. There
are many situations in which rankings of individual objects suffice for classification or …

We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we
introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral …

This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist
any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant …

We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas.
Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching …

Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a
natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees …

Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples
include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching …

For a two-sided multipartner matching model where agents are given by path-independent
choice functions and no quota restrictions, Blair [7] had shown that stable matchings always …

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our
characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and …