Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not
have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to …

Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied assuming
known preferences. In reality agents often have to learn about their preferences through …

We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate
an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesian-optimal …

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user
preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. But since …

Abstract The 2020 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel was awarded to Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson for “improvements to auction …

Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a
clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is …

We study digital multisided platforms as complex adaptive business systems (CABS) where
multiple sides have different and evolving objectives, preferences, and constraints. CABS …

We explore the acquisition and flow of information in matching markets through a model of
college admissions with endogenous costly information acquisition. We extend the notion of …

Importance Preference signals were to be implemented in over 15 specialties during the
2022-2023 residency match. Analyzing results from the implementation of signals during the …