Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

This paper provides a different approach to establish the uniqueness of equilibrium in
Tullock contests between two players with asymmetric valuations, when the discriminatory …

In multi-battle team contests with pairwise battles, how battles are organized—sequentially
or (partially) simultaneously—may affect the expected winner's total effort (WE), a natural …

We consider incentives for organizing competitions in multiple rounds, focusing on situations
where there is heterogeneity among the contestants ex ante, which discourages effort in a …

We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and
how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents' efforts …

We study best-of-three all-pay auctions with two players who compete in three stages with a
single match per stage. The first player to win two matches wins the contest. We assume that …

This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a team contest with an arbitrary number
(odd or even) of pairwise battles. In a setting with full heterogeneity across players and …

We show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient
environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi‐battle dynamic …

We consider a best-of-three Tullock contest between two ex-ante symmetric players. An
effort-maximizing designer commits to a vector of three biases (advantages or …

We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the
prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests …