Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information - ScienceDirect Skip to
main contentSkip to article Elsevier logo Journals & Books Search RegisterSign in View PDF …

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante
asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of …

We show that under standard assumptions every member of a broad class of generalized
Tullock contests with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian Nash …

The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly Page 1 Games and Economic Behavior
44 (2003) 272–285 www.elsevier.com/locate/geb The value of public information in a Cournot …

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential and finite
information. This class is characterized by the property that each bidder's information set is …

I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-
buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where …

We study a discrete common-value auction environment with two asymmetrically informed
bidders. Equilibrium of the first-price auction is in mixed strategies, which we characterize …

The series" The Economics and management of art and culture" is an initiative belonging to
Icare-the International Center for Art Economics-of the University Ca'Foscari of Venice. It is …

We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric
information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over …

In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain and the elasticity of
the marginal cost of effort is increasing (decreasing), the effect of changes of players' …