An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property
R van den Brink - International Journal of Game Theory, 2002 - Springer
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a
fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two …
fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two …
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited
A Laruelle, F Valenciano - Mathematics of operations …, 2001 - pubsonline.informs.org
We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in
the domain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity …
the domain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity …
[图书][B] A course on cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory deals with situations where objectives of participants of the game
are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It is in the interest of participants to …
are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It is in the interest of participants to …
Axiomatizations of the normalized Banzhaf value and the Shapley value
R Van den Brink, G Van der Laan - Social Choice and Welfare, 1998 - Springer
A cooperative game with transferable utilities–or simply a TU-game–describes a situation in
which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games …
which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A solution concept for these games …
On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
AS Nowak - International Journal of Game Theory, 1997 - Springer
On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom Page 1 International
Journal of Game Theory (1997) 26:137-141 Note On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value …
Journal of Game Theory (1997) 26:137-141 Note On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value …
Null players out? Linear values for games with variable supports
The paper studies the consequences of the Null Player Out (NPO) property for single-valued
solutions on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form. We allow for …
solutions on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form. We allow for …
A comparative axiomatic characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value
JM Alonso-Meijide, F Carreras… - Decision Support …, 2007 - Elsevier
A compact axiomatic characterization of the modified Banzhaf value for games with a
coalition structure (Banzhaf–Owen value, for short) is provided. The axiomatic system used …
coalition structure (Banzhaf–Owen value, for short) is provided. The axiomatic system used …
Collusion, exclusion, and inclusion in random-order bargaining
I Segal - The Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - academic.oup.com
This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game
solved by a random-order value (eg the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is …
solved by a random-order value (eg the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is …
Comparing power indices
This paper aims to give a global vision concerning the state of the art of studies on 13 power
indices and to establish which of them are more suitable for describing the real situations …
indices and to establish which of them are more suitable for describing the real situations …
Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Y Kamijo, T Kongo - European Journal of Operational Research, 2012 - Elsevier
This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for
cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency …
cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency …