The constant-time programming discipline (CT) is an efficient countermeasure against timing
side-channel attacks, requiring the control flow and the memory accesses to be independent …

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage
attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process …

Cryptographic implementations are a valuable target for address-based side-channel
attacks and should, thus, be protected against them. Countermeasures, however, are often …

CPU cache is a limited but crucial storage component in modern processors, whereas the
cache timing side-channel may inadvertently leak information through the physically …

Cryptography secures our online interactions, transactions, and trust. To achieve this goal,
not only do the cryptographic primitives and protocols need to be secure in theory, they also …

Cache side-channel attacks extract secrets by examining how victim software accesses
cache. To date, practical attacks on crypto systems and media libraries are demonstrated …

This article tackles the problem of designing efficient binary-level verification for a subset of
information flow properties encompassing constant-time and secret-erasure. These …

Side-channel attacks allow adversaries to infer sensitive information from non-functional
characteristics. Prior side-channel detection work is able to identify numerous potential …

Cache side-channel attacks exhibit severe threats to software security and privacy,
especially for cryptosystems. In this paper, we propose CaType, a novel refinement type …

Schedule randomization is one of the recently introduced security defenses against
schedule-based attacks, ie, attacks whose success depends on a particular ordering …