We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …

Auction-style pricing policies can effectively reflect the underlying trends in demand and
supply for the cloud resources, and thereby attracted a research interest recently. In …

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a crucial component in the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT),
mainly due to its role in collecting data and enhancing applications. Nonetheless, it faces …

We study a generalization of the classical secretary problem which we call the “matroid
secretary problem”. In this problem, the elements of a matroid are presented to an online …

Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping
theory—particularly secretary problems—in the design of approximately optimal online …

We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet
advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is …

Online mechanisms extend the methods of mechanism design to dynamic environments
with multiple agents and private information. Decisions must be made as information about …

This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for
access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each …

Carrier collaboration in transportation means multiple carriers form an alliance to optimize
their transportation operations through sharing transportation requests and vehicle …

The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by
participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design …