An -regret analysis of Adversarial Bilateral Trade
We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely
arbitrary ({\sl ie}, determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with …
arbitrary ({\sl ie}, determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with …
Approximately efficient bilateral trade
We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …
Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly …
Approximating gains from trade in two-sided markets via simple mechanisms
We design simple mechanisms to approximate the Gains from Trade (GFT) in two-sided
markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical …
markets with multiple unit-supply sellers and multiple unit-demand buyers. A classical …
Bilateral trade: A regret minimization perspective
N Cesa-Bianchi, T Cesari… - Mathematics of …, 2024 - pubsonline.informs.org
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
A regret analysis of bilateral trade
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they …
An online learning theory of brokerage
We investigate brokerage between traders from an online learning perspective. At any round
$ t $, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price …
$ t $, two traders arrive with their private valuations, and the broker proposes a trading price …
Efficient two-sided markets with limited information
A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …
Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions
We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided
markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and …
markets. The markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and …
Budget-feasible mechanisms in two-sided crowdsensing markets: Truthfulness, fairness, and efficiency
In a crowdsensing platform, users are invited to provide data services, and multiple
requesters compete for desired services. Due to users' costs of providing services, it is …
requesters compete for desired services. Due to users' costs of providing services, it is …
Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
L Blumrosen, Y Mizrahi - Web and Internet Economics: 12th International …, 2016 - Springer
We consider the design of platforms that facilitate trade between a single seller and a single
buyer. The most efficient mechanisms for such settings are complex and sometimes even …
buyer. The most efficient mechanisms for such settings are complex and sometimes even …