Unlawful collusion is when firms have a mutual understanding to coordinate their behavior
for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive outcome. Given the legal focus on mutual …

We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of
complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social …

A central aspect of strategic reasoning in sequential games consists in anticipating how co-
players would react to information about past play, which in turn depends on how co-players …

We analyze forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information assuming
some commonly understood restrictions on beliefs. Specifically, we assume that some given …

Strong-Δ-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward
induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability …

We study robust mechanism design in environments in which agents commonly believe that
others' types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is …

Backward Induction is a fundamental concept in game theory. As an algorithm, it can only be
used to analyze a very narrow class of games, but its logic is also invoked, albeit informally …

We extend the epistemic analysis of dynamic games of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (J Econ
Theory 88: 188–230, 1999, J Econ Theory 106: 356–391, 2002, Res Econ 61: 165–184 …

The paper examines how pre‐play communication between players with partial credibility
affects the ensuing strategic interaction. We consider an environment where players are …

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the
opponents will play. If these theories are commonly known, players will refine their first-order …