Strategic analysis of auctions

R Wilson - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 1992 - Elsevier
Publisher Summary This chapter describes several forms of auctions, presents the
formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical …

The role of information in US offshore oil and gas lease auctions

RH Porter - 1992 - nber.org
This paper describes the US offshore oil and gas lease sales, conducted by the Department
of the Interior since 1954. Several decision problems are discussed, including bidding for …

Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data

JJ Laffont - European Economic Review, 1997 - Elsevier
This paper is a survey of applied work with auction data. First, we summarize the pre-game
theoretic competitive bidding literature based on decision theory and the associated …

Auctions for oil and gas leases with an informed bidder and a random reservation price

K Hendricks, RH Porter, CA Wilson - Econometrica: Journal of the …, 1994 - JSTOR
We analyze a first-price, sealed bid auction with a random reservation price to study the
federal sales of offshore oil and gas leases on drainage tracts. Our model assumes the …

Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

CA Holt, W Shobe, D Burtraw, KL Palmer… - Available at SSRN …, 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
The purpose of this study was to design an auction mechanism for use by the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) for selling emission allowances. We conducted a series of …

A survey of recent empirical work concerning auctions

K Hendricks, HJ Paarsch - Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995 - JSTOR
In this paper, we survey some recent empirical work concerning auctions, first outlining two
complementary approaches to the empirical analysis of auctions, and then discussing …

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

A Tillio, N Kos, M Messner - The Review of Economic Studies, 2016 - academic.oup.com
This article explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the
seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can …

Common values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous entry in US offshore oil lease auctions

G Compiani, P Haile… - Journal of Political …, 2020 - journals.uchicago.edu
Although an auction of drilling rights is often cited as an example of common values, formal
evidence has been limited by the problem of auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. We …

[图书][B] Auktionstheorie und interne Organisation

M Kräkel - 2013 - books.google.com
In den letzten Jahren ist in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre das Interesse an mikroöko
nomischen Erklärungsansätzen deutlich gestiegen. Neue Ideen und Konzepte werden auf …

[PDF][PDF] Hidden reserve prices with risk averse bidders

H Li, G Tan - University of British Columbia Working Paper, 2000 - Citeseer
In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for why aucM tioneers often keep the
reserve price hidden or secret. We consider a standard independent private values …