We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good
monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of …

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The
buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) …

Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a
notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show …

Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in
multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary-possibly combinatorial-feasibility …

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …

Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single
buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods …

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale
to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from …

We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal
mechanism design problem-a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by …