A survey of papers on practically significant restrictions on the preference profile of a
collective is carried out, including single-peaked preferences, group-separable preferences …

Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile
some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t …

We consider domains in strategic voting problems which satisfy three properties, namely top-
connectedness, pervasiveness, and richness. We prove the following two results for such a …

The paper studies a variety of domains of preference orders that are closely related to single-
peaked preferences. We develop recursive formulas for the number of single-peaked …

A domain D is dictatorial iff there exists no surjective, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial
social choice function defined over D. A dictatorial domain D is superdictatorial iff every …

We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence
condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12: 259–272, 1976) and Baigent (J Econ 47 (4) …

Проведен обзор работ по практически значимым ограничениям на профиль
предпочтений коллектива: однопиковые предпочтения, сепарабельные предпочтения …

Let A be a set of alternatives whose power set is\bf A. Elements of\bf A are interpreted as
non-resolute outcomes. We consider the aggregation of preference profiles over\bf A into a …

We examine the possibility of Arrovian social choice when alternatives consist of outcomes
and opportunity sets from which they are chosen. Consequentialism is a choice attitude …

Arrow's classical axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives may be more descriptively
thought of as binary independence. This can then be weakened to ternary independence …