English summary: Lars P. Feld evaluates the economic arguments for or against tax
competition in a federal polity and summarizes the empirical evidence concerned with the …

The contents of this book reflect my academic interests in local government, public choice
theory and research methodology. During the last ten years, my work on these topics has …

The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his
preference pattern for public goods. At the central level the preferences of the consumer …

The debate in the UK on the reform of local government structure is poorly informed by
empirical evidence. This article bridges part of the empirical gap by drawing upon analyses …

According to the Leviathan Model, fiscal federalism is a binding constraint on revenue‐
maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism reduces public sector …

Sažetak Within the public choice framework, it has been argued that decentralised authority
over the provision and financing of certain public goods and services induces competitive …

Prior analyses of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of government
treat fiscal decentralization as the decentralization of either taxing or spending powers. But …

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has
continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis …

This study uses a state-level panel data set (1979-1992), encompassing all levels of
government, to test the applicability of three theories concerning government size-the Wallis …

Public choice and especially the economic theory of politics was one of the starting points of
the 'New Institutional Economics'. In the beginning, there were two almost contradictory …