We study loss aversion in elections by investigating a median voter model (full convergence
in a two‐candidate election) and a model of partial divergence of policy proposals. First, we …

Two mechanisms of costly signaling are known in international relations: sinking costs and
tying hands. I show that there exist four mechanisms of costly signaling that are equally …

We propose a theory of democratic backsliding where citizens' retrospective assessment of
an incumbent politician depends on expectations that are endogenous to the incumbent's …

Why populations brutalized in war elect their tormentors One of the great puzzles of electoral
politics is how parties that commit mass atrocities in war often win the support of victimized …

How does the potential for socialization affect states' abilities to reassure each other and
mitigate the security dilemma? Rationalist scholarship has identified numerous mechanisms …

Throughout history, reform has provoked rebellion-not just by the losers from reform, but also
among its intended beneficiaries. Finkel and Gehlbach emphasize that, especially in weak …

Emotions shape strategic conflict dynamics. However, the precise way in which strategic and
emotional concerns interact to affect international cooperation and contention are not well …

Sinking costs to signal resolve has become a vital part of how the field of international
relations (IR) understands crisis bargaining. The logic of a resolved state “burning money” to …

Under standard assumptions, costly voting models predict that the supporters of the
underdog–ie, of the candidate that is expected to lose–are less likely to abstain than the …

How do leaders' statements about conflict duration affect public support for their handling of
war? We build on two disparate strands of prior research to theorize how approval depends …