Sponsored search has been proven to be a successful business model, and sponsored
search auctions have become a hot research direction. There have been many exciting …

We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget
constraints. Our mechanism is a careful modification of the Generalized English Auction of …

We study envy-free (EF) mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with budgeted agents that
approximately maximize revenue. In an EF auction, prices are set so that every bidder …

This paper finds welfare-and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning a divisible
good to a population of budget-constrained agents who have independently distributed …

Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from internet advertising to
platforms such as eBay. In most of these applications the auctions in use are single/multi …

Rent division consists in simultaneously computing an allocation of rooms to agents and a
payment, starting from an individual valuation of each room by each agent. When agents …

Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a
market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market …

We consider the problem of designing budget feasible mechanisms for a dealer, who aims
to maximize revenue by buying items from a seller market and selling them to a buyer …

Consider a market with n unit demand buyers and m sellers, each selling one unit of an
indivisible good. The buyers specify their preferences over items via utility functions u ij (pj) …

We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that
approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free …