On the Distortion of Committee Election with 1-Euclidean Preferences and Few Distance Queries
D Fotakis, L Gourvès, P Patsilinakos - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.11755, 2024 - arxiv.org
We consider committee election of $ k\geq 2$(out of $ m\geq k+ 1$) candidates, where the
voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's …
voters and the candidates are associated with locations on the real line. Each voter's …
The Distortion of Threshold Approval Matching
M Latifian, AA Voudouris - arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.09858, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study matching settings in which a set of agents have private utilities over a set of items.
Each agent reports a partition of the items into approval sets of different threshold utility …
Each agent reports a partition of the items into approval sets of different threshold utility …
Metric Distortion of Obnoxious Distributed Voting
AA Voudouris - arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.11492, 2024 - arxiv.org
We consider a distributed voting problem with a set of agents that are partitioned into disjoint
groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by …
groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by …
Decoding Distortion: Pushing the Limits of Optimal Collective Decision-Making
M Latifian - 2024 - search.proquest.com
A fundamental question in social choice theory and multi-agent systems is how to aggregate
individual agents' preferences to make a prudent collective decision. A promising line of …
individual agents' preferences to make a prudent collective decision. A promising line of …