Beyond dominant resource fairness: Extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities

DC Parkes, AD Procaccia, N Shah - ACM Transactions on Economics …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
We study the problem of allocating multiple resources to agents with heterogeneous
demands. Technological advances such as cloud computing and data centers provide a …

Approximate strategyproofness

B Lubin, DC Parkes - Current Science, 2012 - JSTOR
The standard approach of mechanism design theory insists on equilibrium behaviour by
participants. This assumption is captured by imposing incentive constraints on the design …

Bitcoinf: Achieving fairness for bitcoin in transaction-fee-only model

S Siddiqui, G Vanahalli, S Gujar - arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.00801, 2020 - arxiv.org
A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A
fair blockchain is expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power, low …

Combinatorial civic crowdfunding with budgeted agents: welfare optimality at equilibrium and optimal deviation

S Damle, M Padala, S Gujar - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on …, 2023 - ojs.aaai.org
Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the``power of the crowd" to garner contributions towards
public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to``free-ride," …

Dynamic incentive mechanisms

DC Parkes, R Cavallo, F Constantin, S Singh - Ai Magazine, 2010 - ojs.aaai.org
Much of AI is concerned with the design of intelligent agents. A complementary challenge is
to understand how to design “rules of encounter” by which to promote simple, robust and …

[PDF][PDF] Dynamic matching in overloaded systems

JD Leshno - URL hp://www. people. fas. harvard. edu/jleshno …, 2012 - users.nber.org
In many assignment problems items arrive stochastically over time. When items are scarce,
agents form an overloaded waiting list and items are dynamically allocated as they arrive; …

Auction based mechanisms for dynamic task assignments in expert crowdsourcing

S Gujar, B Faltings - … . Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for …, 2017 - Springer
Crowdsourcing marketplaces link large populations of workers to an even larger number of
tasks. Thus, it is necessary to have mechanisms for matching workers with interesting and …

[PDF][PDF] Designing Game-theoretically Sound, Fair, and Private Multi-agent Systems

S Damle - 2024 - cdn.iiit.ac.in
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are distributed systems composed of multiple autonomous
agents interacting to achieve a common or conflicting goal. MAS tackles complex and …

[PDF][PDF] Optimal social decision making

N Shah - 2016 - reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu
How can computers help ordinary people make collective decisions about real-life
dilemmas, like which restaurant to go to with friends, or even how to divide an inheritance …

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights

J Yi, Y Li - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016 - Elsevier
In this paper, we generalize Green and Laffont's (1979) impossibility theorem to the
following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent's types is …