We consider mechanism design in which message sets are restricted owing to
communication costs, preventing full revelation of information. A principal contracts with …

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over
an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary …

We model two agents who wish to determine if their types match, but who also desire to
reveal as little information as possible to non-matching types. For example, firms considering …

While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the type space
of the players and their action space, behavioral, technical or regulatory factors can severely …

In this paper, we study the problem of a venture investor who distributes the budget between
several innovation projects under conditions of uncertainty. A common method for solving …

We study negotiations with limited specifiability—each party may not be able to fully specify
a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative …

This paper considers dynamic resource allocation processes, called iterative revelation
mechanisms, with quasi-linear dichotomous utilities and complete information. Agents …

Many institutions aggregate information for a common objective via coarse communication.
Coarseness gives rise to interesting institution design problems which would otherwise be …

В работе рассматривается задача венчурного инвестора, распределяющего бюджет
между несколькими инновационными проектами в условиях неопределенности …