Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to market definition

J Farrell, C Shapiro - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010 - degruyter.com
We describe a simple initial indicator of whether a proposed merger between rivals in a
differentiated product industry is likely to raise prices through unilateral effects. Our …

Green antitrust:(more) friendly fire in the fight against climate change

MP Schinkel, L Treuren - This is an updated and extended version …, 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
The green antitrust movement aims to increase sustainability efforts by allowing restrictions
of competition. Yet the economic evidence so far points to more, not less, competition as the …

An aggregative games approach to merger analysis in multiproduct-firm oligopoly

V Nocke, N Schutz - 2018 - nber.org
Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of
multiproduct-firm price competition with nested CES or nested logit demands. We show that …

Unilateral effects screens for partial horizontal acquisitions: The generalized HHI and GUPPI

D Brito, A Osório, R Ribeiro, H Vasconcelos - International Journal of …, 2018 - Elsevier
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing
the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose a generalization of the two most …

Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions

D Brito, R Ribeiro, H Vasconcelos - international Journal of industrial …, 2014 - Elsevier
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing
the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural …

[图书][B] Law and economics in European merger control

U Schwalbe, D Zimmer - 2009 - books.google.com
Law and Economics in European Merger Control provides a thorough introduction to the
economic theory underlying the regulation of mergers. The central economic concepts of …

Assessing EU merger control through compensating efficiencies

P Affeldt, T Duso, KP Gugler, J Piechucka - 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
Worldwide, the overwhelming majority of large horizontal mergers are cleared by antitrust
authorities unconditionally. The presumption seems to be that efficiencies from these …

Organizational Form and Enforcement Innovation

LM Froeb, BH Kobayashi, JM Yun - George Mason Law & …, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
In this article, we examine one mechanism through which enforcement innovation occurs
and is passed into practice at the US antitrust agencies. Our main thesis is that agency …

Mergers when firms compete by choosing both price and promotion

S Tenn, L Froeb, S Tschantz - International Journal of Industrial …, 2010 - Elsevier
We analyze the bias from predicting merger effects using structural models of price
competition when firms actually compete using both price and promotion. We extend the …

Can mergers increase output? Evidence from the lodging industry

A Kalnins, L Froeb, S Tschantz - The RAND Journal of …, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
We find that hotel mergers increase occupancy. In some specifications, price also rises.
Because these effects occur only in markets with high capacity utilization and high …