Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions

RB Myerson, PJ Reny - Econometrica, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets
of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional ε‐equilibrium if, for any of a player's …

Refinement of acyclic-and-asymmetric payoff aggregates of pure strategy efficient Nash equilibria in finite noncooperative games by maximultimin and superoptimality

V Romanuke - Decision Making: Applications in Management …, 2021 - dmame-journal.org
A theory of refining pure strategy efficient Nash equilibria in finite noncooperative games
under uncertainty is outlined. The theory is based on guaranteeing the corresponding …

Approximation of isomorphic infinite two-person non-cooperative games by variously sampling the players' payoff functions and reshaping payoff matrices into bimatrix …

VV Romanuke, VV Kamburg - Applied Computer Systems, 2016 - sciendo.com
Approximation in solving the infinite two-person non-cooperative games is studied in the
paper. An approximation approach with conversion of infinite game into finite one is …

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

O Andersson, C Argenton, JW Weibull - Games and Economic Behavior, 2014 - Elsevier
We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum
strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an …

Uniform sampling of the infinite noncooperative game on unit hypercube and reshaping ultimately multidimensional matrices of player's payoff values

V Romanuke - Electrical, Control and Communication Engineering, 2015 - sciendo.com
The paper suggests a method of obtaining an approximate solution of the infinite
noncooperative game on the unit hypercube. The method is based on sampling uniformly …

Pure strategy Nash equilibria refinement in bimatrix games by using domination efficiency along with maximin and the superoptimality rule

VV Romanuke - Наукові вісті КПІ, 2018 - irbis-nbuv.gov.ua
Background. Multiple Nash equilibria bring a new problem of selecting amongst them but
this problem is solved by refining the equilibria. However, none of the existing refinements …

[PDF][PDF] A couple of collective utility and minimum payoff parity loss rules for refining Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with asymmetric payoffs

VV Romanuke - Visnyk of Kremenchuk National University of …, 2018 - visnikkrnu.kdu.edu.ua
Polish Naval Academy vul. Śmidowicza, 69, Gdynia, Poland, 81–127. E-mail:
romanukevadimv@ gmail. com Purpose. For furthering the known approaches to the Nash …

Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement

O Carbonell-Nicolau, RP McLean - Economic Theory, 2013 - Springer
We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when
payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new “finitistic” …

Informative campaigns, overpromising, and policy bargaining

D Kim, G Lin, KE Schnakenberg - Journal of Theoretical …, 2024 - journals.sagepub.com
What is the relationship between policy positions taken in campaigns and those proposed in
bargaining when the final policy outcome depends on other political actors? Why do …

Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games

E Bajoori, J Flesch, D Vermeulen - Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 - Elsevier
We develop the notion of perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium—perfect BNE—in general
Bayesian games. We test perfect BNE against the criteria laid out by Kohlberg and Mertens …