Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with incomplete
information. Two symmetric players have either high or low private value. The contest …

We model competition between two teams (that may differ in size) as an all-pay contest with
incomplete information where team members exert effort to increase the performance of their …

We analyze all-pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals. We analyze the unique
symmetric equilibrium with any number of bidders and show that the bidders earn positive …

This paper investigates the conditions for full preemption of conflicts in the form of all-pay
auctions. I define two notions of conflict preemption: to implement peace on path with …

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest.
Before the contest, each player can spy on the opponent by privately acquiring a costly …

We study all-pay auctions where each player observes her private value as well as a noisy
private signal about the opponent's value, following Fang and Morris's (J Econ Theory 126 …

Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially
unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she …

This paper investigates the existence of a nondegenerate pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in a double auction between one seller and several heterogeneous buyers in …

We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both …