We review a large formal literature on economic models of voting and electoral politics. We
discuss two broad classes of model: those focusing on preference aggregation and those …

In this analysis of how electoral rules and outcomes shape the internal organization of
political parties, we make an analogy to primary elections to argue that parties use …

Canonical theories of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed,
which necessitates separate models for democratic and nondemocratic elections. To …

The supporters of a mainstream candidate contemplate voting for a special‐issue minority
party (which risks opening the door to a disliked opponent) in order to influence mainstream …

In the recent decades, citizens all over the world took to the streets to oppose predatory
autocracies. We provide a theory of mass politics examining how civil protests affect …

I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty over the
popularities of the candidates, where voting is costly, and where voters are instrumentally …

We study governance when shareholders vote and can also buy or sell shares. We find that
voting for the policy that one believes is better for the firm maximizes portfolio value only …

Parties can elitcit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or
rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which …

I consider a two-candidate election in which there is aggregate uncertainty about the
popularity of each candidate, where voting is costly, and where participants are …

We present an incomplete information model of two-stage elections in which candidates can
choose different platforms in primaries and general elections. Voters do not directly observe …