This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design,
to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving …

We consider a setting where $ p $ public resources are to be allocated among $ n $
competing and strategic agents so as to maximize social welfare (the objects should be …

Redistribution mechanisms have been proposed for more efficient resource allocation but
not for profit. We consider redistribution mechanism design in a setting where participants …

Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user
transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (ie, transaction fees) …

We consider efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Green and
Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof …

We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n> m agents, assuming
each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming it. We assume …

Many scenarios where participants hold private information require payments to encourage
truthful revelation. Some of these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would …

We study worst-case VCG redistribution mechanism design for the public project problem.
The mechanism design task comes down to designing a payment function that maximizes …

The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms …

Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources
among the agents. For resource allocation problems, the well-known VCG mechanism …