Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
We prove that the Maskin monotonicity⁎ condition (proposed by Bergemann et al.(2011))
fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and …
fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and …
Robust Robustness
I Ball, D Kattwinkel - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.16898, 2024 - arxiv.org
The maxmin approach to distributional robustness evaluates each mechanism according to
its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We propose a refinement: the …
its payoff guarantee over all priors in an ambiguity set. We propose a refinement: the …
Robust Implementation with Costly Information
H Pei, B Strulovici - Review of Economic Studies, 2025 - academic.oup.com
We construct mechanisms that can robustly implement any desired social choice function
when (1) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world,(2) with small probability …
when (1) agents may incur a cost to learn the state of the world,(2) with small probability …
Rationalizable incentives: Interim implementation of sets in rationalizable strategies
T Kunimoto, R Serrano - 2020 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice sets (SCSs) in
incomplete information environments. We identify rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC) …
incomplete information environments. We identify rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC) …