[PDF][PDF] Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback

V Conitzer, R Freedman, J Heitzig… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - researchgate.net
Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic
behavior, so that, for example, they refuse to comply with requests for help with committing …

Computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss - Multiagent systems, 2012 - books.google.com
Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …

Iterative voting

R Meir - Trends in computational social choice, 2017 - books.google.com
In typical theoretical models of voting, all voters submit their vote at once, without an option
to change or revise their decision. While this assumption fits some political voting settings, it …

[PDF][PDF] Voter response to iterated poll information

A Reijngoud - 2012 - eprints.illc.uva.nl
We develop a formal model of opinion polls in elections and study how they influence voting
behaviour, and thereby elections outcomes. We analyse two settings. In the first, we study a …

A local-dominance theory of voting equilibria

R Meir, O Lev, JS Rosenschein - … of the fifteenth ACM conference on …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters
consider a set of possible outcomes without assigning probabilities to them. We prove that …

[图书][B] Strategic voting

R Meir - 2018 - books.google.com
Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

Collective decision making under incomplete knowledge: possible and necessary solutions

J Lang - Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on …, 2020 - hal.science
Most solution concepts in collective decision making are defined assuming complete
knowledge of individuals' preferences and of the mechanism used for aggregating them …

Strategic voting with incomplete information

U Endriss, S Obraztsova, M Polukarov… - 2016 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic
manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding …

Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?

T Walsh - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2011 - Springer
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint
actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot …

Plurality voting under uncertainty

R Meir - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2015 - ojs.aaai.org
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where
game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order …