To remain competitive, an organization must both respond to information about its
environment and coordinate its activities. We analyse how the allocation of decision rights …

We develop a model of experimentation and learning in policymaking when control of power
is temporary. We demonstrate how an early office holder who would otherwise not …

We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its
ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if …

We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an
environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication …

I investigate the link between a firm's operating environment and its preferred organizational
structure, as determined by the allocation of decision rights, the compensation structure of its …

In a cheap‐talk setting where the conflict of interest between sender and receiver is
determined endogenously by the choice of parameters θi for each agent i, conditions are …

We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payoffs, which includes the
communication games in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) as …

I analyze a problem of project selection where two agents, privately informed of both the true
value and their bias in favor of their alternatives, make non-verifiable proposals to an …

This paper examines the bargaining over authority in principal–agent relationships in which
a non-contractible decision must be made but decision rights are contractible and …

This paper provides a refinement that uniquely selects the ex-ante Pareto dominant
equilibrium in a cheap talk game, provided one exists. The refinement works by embedding …