We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely
repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple …

We examine cooperation in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented
with noise but intentions are perfectly observable. Observable intentions lead to more …

We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where
actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that …

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for
cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We …

This paper examines play in repeated interactions where intended actions are implemented
with noise and intentions are perfectly observable, and compares it to play in cases where …

Abstract stratEst is a software package for the estimation of finite mixture models of discrete
choice strategies in the statistical computing environment R. Discrete choice strategies can …

We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which
monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of …

Recent experimental studies question whether societies can selfgovern social dilemmas
with the help of decentralized punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the …

To explore the role of communication in promoting cooperation, we let participants indicate
their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with …

This dissertation consists of three independent research papers. The three papers make
distinct contributions to different strains of the economic literature. The unifying element of all …