Executive compensation: A survey of theory and evidence

A Edmans, X Gabaix, D Jenter - The handbook of the economics of …, 2017 - Elsevier
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We
start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and …

Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership

JJ He, J Huang, S Zhao - Journal of Financial Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
We analyze the role of institutional cross-ownership in internalizing corporate governance
externalities using granular mutual fund proxy voting data. Exploiting within-proposal and …

Asymmetric spillover of geopolitical risk and oil price volatility: a global perspective

Z Zhang, Y Wang, B Li - Resources Policy, 2023 - Elsevier
This paper uses the generalized VAR framework to study the asymmetric spillover between
geopolitical risk and oil price volatility for six major regions in the world. Based on the …

Executive compensation: A modern primer

A Edmans, X Gabaix - Journal of Economic literature, 2016 - aeaweb.org
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing
them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader …

Social learning and corporate peer effects

M Kaustia, V Rantala - Journal of Financial Economics, 2015 - Elsevier
We find that firms are more likely to split their stock if their peer firms have recently done so.
The effect is comparable to an increase of 40–50% in the share price. Splitting probability is …

Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation

JC Bettis, J Bizjak, JL Coles, S Kalpathy - Journal of Accounting and …, 2018 - Elsevier
The usage of performance-vesting (pv) equity awards to top executives in large US
companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of …

Industry tournament incentives

JL Coles, Z Li, AY Wang - The Review of Financial Studies, 2018 - academic.oup.com
We empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs, as measured by the
compensation gap between a CEO at one firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar …

The pay of corporate executives and financial professionals as evidence of rents in top 1 percent incomes

J Bivens, L Mishel - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013 - aeaweb.org
The debate over the extent and causes of rising inequality of American incomes and wages
has now raged for at least two decades. In this paper, we will make four arguments. First, the …

Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts

G Gong, LY Li, JY Shin - The Accounting Review, 2011 - publications.aaahq.org
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive
compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms' first proxy …

Peer choice in CEO compensation

AM Albuquerque, G De Franco, RS Verdi - Journal of Financial Economics, 2013 - Elsevier
Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We …