Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information

LM Ausubel, O Baranov - International Journal of Game Theory, 2020 - Springer
Core-selecting auctions were proposed as alternatives to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)
mechanism for environments with complementarities. In this paper, we consider a simple …

Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem

H Atef Yekta, D Bergman, R Day - Naval Research Logistics …, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental managerial function typically
involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the …

[PDF][PDF] Combinatorial versus Holistic Procurement: The Role of Information Frictions

S Deng, Q Fu, Z Wu - 2024 - shanglyudeng.com
Large-scale infrastructure projects often involve multiple component tasks and require a
range of skills. When procuring such projects, an auctioneer can either organize a …

An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

R Sano - Review of Economic Design, 2018 - Springer
This study analyzes the equilibrium of a core-selecting package auction under incomplete
information. The ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (Front Theor Econ 1: 1 …

[PDF][PDF] KIER DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

R Sano - 2015 - kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
This study analyzes the equilibrium of core-selecting auctions under incomplete information.
We consider the ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) in a stylized …

Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions

R Sano - KIER Discussion Paper, 2015 - repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp
This study analyzes the equilibrium of core-selecting auctions under incomplete information.
We consider the ascending proxy auction of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) in a stylized …