We provide a model of self-selection by candidates in a probabilistic voting environment to
shed light on the forces shaping the quality of politicians from both the supply and demand …

In a large-scale controlled trial in collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian
incumbent mayor, we administered (randomized) messages about the candidate's valence …

We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial
preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians. We …

Can voters in clientelist countries be swayed by programmatic promises? Results from a
structural model and a field experiment disseminating candidate policy platforms in …

Political economy has primarily paid attention to the principal‐agent relationship between
citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political …

I study elections between citizen-candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments
before taking office, but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re-election. In …

We develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate
valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties' median legislators …

This paper shows how to identify and estimate, using standard semi-parametric techniques,
a class of dynamic games with perfect monitoring, that have been at the frontier of recent …

When campaigning for reelection, incumbent parties' promises to voters are constrained by
their records in office, while opposition parties can use their time away from power to …

Does political selection matter for policy in representative governments? I use administrative
data on local politicians in Finland and exploit exogenous variation generated by close …