We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate
governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering …

Firms that wish to raise capital from external investors can signal favorable private
information about their long-term prospects by publicly adopting a liberal accounting system …

We study how the precision of managers' private post-contract pre-decision information
affects the pay–performance relation. Endogenizing the information environment, we find …

How CEO-Friendly Should Boards With Limited Attention Be?∗ Page 1 How CEO-Friendly
Should Boards With Limited Attention Be?∗ Martin Gregor† Beatrice Michaeli‡ December 22 …

We study the impact of asymmetric (ie, conservative or aggressive) disclosure on a firm's
price in the classic setting in which its stock is traded by risk-averse investors and noise or …

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to
and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions …

Traditional agency models study communication in settings where agents are better
informed than principals. However, in many settings, principals have better information than …

I study a contracting game played by a recruitment agent and their client. The client pays the
agent if they find a match. Search costs depend on market thickness, which the agent …

Investor Beliefs and Corporate Disclosure Timing in the Presence of External Sources of
Information Page 1 Investor Beliefs and Corporate Disclosure Timing in the Presence of …