This chapter surveys the developments in price discrimination theory as it applies to
imperfectly competitive markets. Broad themes and conclusions are discussed in the areas …

This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on
the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the …

内容提要: 本文将国内市场分割和边际成本与固定成本之间的反向关系引入Melitz (2003)
的模型, 构建了一个开放经济模型. 文章证明了国内市场分割导致不同生产技术的企业都首选 …

This article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on
incentives. The article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive …

We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the
distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are …

Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper
establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd …

It is a common argument in law and economics that divided ownership can create or
exacerbate strategic behavior. For instance, when several persons own the land designated …

The new economics of regulation is an application of the principal-agent methodology to the
contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms. After a critique of the …

This paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an
informed agent when the latter's reservation utility depends on his type. The informational …

In this paper, an analytical study is performed on an online retailer's omnichannel retail
operations in which consumers can cancel their order before payment and return the …