Transaction fee mechanism design

T Roughgarden - Journal of the ACM, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply,
necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include “on-chain” from …

Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, T Roughgarden, E Shi - … of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …

Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - International Conference on …, 2024 - Springer
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Barriers to collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms

Y Gafni, A Yaish - Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee
mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden (2021) asks whether there is a TFM that is …

Transaction fee mechanism design in a post-mev world

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024 - eprint.iacr.org
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

A Ganesh, C Thomas, SM Weinberg - arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.07566, 2024 - arxiv.org
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction
inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is …

Mechanism Design for ZK-Rollup Prover Markets

W Wang, L Zhou, A Yaish, F Zhang, B Fisch… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs.
Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over …

Transaction fee mechanism for Proof-of-Stake protocol

W Tang, DD Yao - arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.13881, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study a mechanism design problem in the blockchain proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol. Our
main objective is to extend the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) recently proposed in …

Bayesian mechanism design for blockchain transaction fee allocation

X Chen, D Simchi-Levi, Z Zhao, Y Zhou - arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.13099, 2022 - arxiv.org
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and
satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of …

Transactions Market in Bitcoin: Empirical Analysis of the Demand and Supply Block Space Curves

JJ Rico-Peña, R Arguedas-Sanz… - Computational …, 2024 - Springer
Blockchain transactions market is expected to gain momentum in the coming years, in a
context with gradual transition to fee-regime in many cryptocurrencies, the expansion of …