Microarchitectural side-channel attacks are enjoying a time of explosive growth, mostly
fueled by novel transient execution vulnerabilities. These attacks are capable of leaking …

We propose leakage containment models (LCMs)---novel axiomatic security contracts which
support formally reasoning about the security guarantees of programs when they run on …

Computer architects employ a series of performance optimizations at the micro-architecture
level. These optimizations are meant to be invisible to the programmer but they are implicitly …

Attacks like Spectre abuse speculative execution, one of the key performance optimizations
of modern CPUs. Recently, several testing tools have emerged to automatically detect …

How will future microarchitectures impact the security of existing cryptographic
implementations? As we cannot keep reducing the size of transistors, chip vendors have …

Speculative vulnerabilities such as Spectre and Meltdown expose speculative execution
state that can be exploited to leak information across security domains via side-channels …

We present Serberus, the first comprehensive mitigation for hardening constant-time (CT)
code against Spectre attacks (involving the PHT, BTB, RSB, STL, and/or PSF speculation …

Cryptography secures our online interactions, transactions, and trust. To achieve this goal,
not only do the cryptographic primitives and protocols need to be secure in theory, they also …

The past decade has seen a deluge of microarchitectural side channels stemming from a
variety of hardware structures (the cache, branch predictor, execution ports, the TLB …

Leaking a program's instruction address (PC) pattern, completely and precisely, has long
been a sought-after capability for microarchitectural side-channel attackers. Case in point …