First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical
analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings …

In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …

The CLIMNEG world simulation (CWS) model is introduced here for simulating cooperative
game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The CWS model is derived from the …

When an environmental problem involves several agents, different environmental indicators
can be chosen. In this paper we derive axiomatically an indicator of “environmental …

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements
(IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper …

The threat posed by climate change has not yet been matched by international agreements
and economic policies that can deliver sharp reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions …

Markets to allocate pollution rights play an important role in current efforts to control pollution
efficiently (the Environmental Protection Agency has allowed firms to trade pollution permits …

This paper empirically tests the interactive effects of air pollution and economic spillovers in
Chinese cities from 2003 to 2010. The results show that Chinese cities benefit from the …

This paper surveys the rapidly growing theoretical literature on international environmental
agreements. The surveyed contributions are classified according to the conceivable …

Diverse and competing principles of equity are argued to be relevant to the burden-sharing
problem for environmental improvement programmes. In this paper, a survey-based …