Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences

P Jain, R Vaish - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2024 - ojs.aaai.org
The maximum Nash social welfare (NSW)---which maximizes the geometric mean of agents'
utilities---is a fundamental solution concept with remarkable fairness and efficiency …

Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities

S Gokhale, H Sagar, R Vaish, J Yadav - arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.14007, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of
agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences …

Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading

A Adiga, Y Trabelsi, T Ferdousi, M Marathe… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global
problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the …

[PDF][PDF] Optimal Seat Arrangement

E Ceylan - scholar.archive.org
Abstract Optimal Seat Arrangement has as input a set of n agents, where each agent has
cardinal preferences over other agents, and an n-vertex undirected graph (called the seat …

Optimal Seat arrangement: Structure, algorithms, and complexity

E Ceylan - 2022 - repositum.tuwien.at
Optimal Seat Arrangement has as input a set of n agents, where each agent has cardinal
preferences over other agents, and an n-vertex undirected graph (called the seat graph) …

On the Coexistence of Stability and Incentive Compatibility in Fractional Matchings

S Narang, Y Narahari - arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05652, 2020 - arxiv.org
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has
been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched …