Battigalli (1997) has shown that in dynamic games with perfect information and without
relevant ties, the forward induction concept of extensive-form rationalizability yields the …

Backward Induction is a fundamental concept in game theory. As an algorithm, it can only be
used to analyze a very narrow class of games, but its logic is also invoked, albeit informally …

We propose a new rationalizability concept for dynamic games with imperfect information,
forward and backward rationalizability, that combines elements from forward and backward …

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the
opponents will play. If these theories are commonly known, players will refine their first-order …

This paper provides a sufficient monotonicity condition for the solution of a rationalizability
procedure to be independent of the order of elimination. The analysis unfolds in an abstract …

We prove that, in sequential games with payoff uncertainty, strong rationalizability
characterizes the path-predictions of forward-induction reasoning across all possible …

In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private
information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each …

We study strategic reasoning in a signaling game where players initially have common
belief in an outcome distribution and in the event that the sender's beliefs are independent of …

Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a
Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the …

Sometimes Artificial Intelligence (AI) has to deal with undecided problems. An undecided
problem has no computer solution. The non-monotonic problem is undecided. Fuzzy logic …