Despite decades of sustained effort, memory corruption attacks continue to be one of the
most serious security threats faced today. They are highly sought after by attackers, as they …

Modern operating systems use hardware support to protect against control-flow hijacking
attacks such as code-injection attacks. Typically, write access to executable pages is …

Fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) has recently been proposed as a
method of efficiently mitigating runtime attacks. In this paper, we introduce the design and …

Due to the prevalence of control-flow hijacking attacks, a wide variety of defense methods to
protect both user space and kernel space code have been developed in the past years. A …

TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel Protection (TZ-RKP) is a novel system that provides real-
time protection of the OS kernel using the ARM TrustZone secure world. TZ-RKP is more …

Return-oriented programming is an effective code-reuse attack in which short code
sequences ending in a ret instruction are found within existing binaries and executed in …

We show that on both the x86 and ARM architectures it is possible to mount return-oriented
programming attacks without using return instructions. Our attacks instead make use of …

We introduce return-oriented programming, a technique by which an attacker can induce
arbitrary behavior in a program whose control flow he has diverted, without injecting any …

The wide adoption of non-executable page protections in recent versions of popular
operating systems has given rise to attacks that employ return-oriented programming (ROP) …

Virtualization is being widely adopted in today's computing systems. Its unique security
advantages in isolating and introspecting commodity OSes as virtual machines (VMs) have …