“Why We Fight reflects Blattman's expertise in economics, political science, and history…
Blattman is a great storyteller, with important insights for us all.”—Richard H. Thaler, winner …

We develop a theory of policy advice that focuses on the relationship between the
competence of the advisor (eg, an expert bureaucracy) and the quality of advice that the …

Political parties sometimes adopt unpopular positions that condemn them to electoral defeat.
This phenomenon is usually ascribed to expressive motives—namely, parties' desire to …

Formal models commonly characterize interstate bargaining as dichotomous, ending in
either war or peace. But there are many forms of coercion—including supporting rebel …

In many environments, professionals have miscalibrated beliefs about their skills and
knowledge, which potentially compromises the quality of their work. Why might a firm be …

The tendency for political appointees to assimilate into the bureaucratic agencies that they
lead is a recurring source of tension between appointees and the executives who appoint …

A substantial literature has been devoted to analyzing how legislators delegate regulatory
power to a more knowledgeable agency. Yet, much less attention has been paid to …

Better-informed individuals are often unable to ignore their private information when
forecasting others' beliefs. We study how this bias, known as “the curse of knowledge,” …

Essays on Incentives in Organizations Page 1 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY Essays on
Incentives in Organizations A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN …

We examine the relationship between private capabilities and war in a new class of crisis
bargaining games. While crisis bargaining games typically only considers outcomes of war …