We analyze the risk-taking incentives of a financial conglomerate that combines a bank and a non-bank financial intermediary. The conglomerate's risk-taking incentives depend on the …
This paper examines national regulators' incentives to intervene in a multinational bank's activities and the extent to which these incentives differ with the bank's foreign …
We identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks' corporate structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary‐based corporate structures benefit from …
C Holthausen, T Rønde - Available at SSRN 301961, 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation …
F Buck, E Schliephake - Journal of Banking & Finance, 2013 - Elsevier
We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off …
T Harr, T Rønde - University of Copenhagen, mimeo, 2003 - Citeseer
We study capital regulation of multinational banks (MBs). The MBs can set up either as one legal unit facing limited liability jointly (branch structure) or as separate units, each subject to …
We analyse a model of financial intermediation in which intermediaries are subject to moral hazard and they do not invest socially optimally, because they ignore the systemic costs of …
This paper analyzes the risk taking of branches and subsidiaries of international bank holding institutions from the perspective of host country regulators in two Latin American …
In the past years, financial markets in the European Union (EU) have been under a profound change. Most importantly, the enlargement of May 2004 brought ten new member countries …