Fairness in matching under uncertainty

S Devic, D Kempe, V Sharan… - … on Machine Learning, 2023 - proceedings.mlr.press
The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention
to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students …

Information acquisition in matching markets: The role of price discovery

N Immorlica, J Leshno, I Lo, B Lucier - Available at SSRN 3705049, 2020 - papers.ssrn.com
We explore the acquisition and flow of information in matching markets through a model of
college admissions with endogenous costly information acquisition. We extend the notion of …

Online stable task assignment in opportunistic mobile crowdsensing with uncertain trajectories

F Yucel, E Bulut - IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In opportunistic mobile crowdsensing, participants (workers) accept to carry out the
requested sensing tasks only if they are already close to or within the regions of interest …

A matching mechanism for public cloud manufacturing platforms using intuitionistic Fuzzy VIKOR and deferred acceptance algorithm

J Delaram, O Fatahi Valilai… - International Journal …, 2021 - Taylor & Francis
Online manufacturing platforms are spreading in the manufacturing industry in the shade of
Cloud Manufacturing systems. The paper manipulates a matching mechanism for public …

Stable marriage with multi-modal preferences

J Chen, R Niedermeier, P Skowron - … of the 2018 ACM Conference on …, 2018 - dl.acm.org
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now
based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank …

Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences

H Aziz, P Biró, S Gaspers, R de Haan, N Mattei… - Algorithmica, 2020 - Springer
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about
the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three …

Matchings under preferences: Strength of stability and tradeoffs

J Chen, P Skowron, M Sorge - ACM Transactions on Economics and …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near
stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classical definition of stability by …

Putting gale & shapley to work: Guaranteeing stability through learning

H Hosseini, S Roy, D Zhang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.04376, 2024 - arxiv.org
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from
one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their …

On the complexity of predicting election outcomes and estimating their robustness

D Baumeister, T Hogrebe - SN Computer Science, 2023 - Springer
When dealing with real-world election data and preferences, it is often realistic to assume
that the given data are incomplete or noisy. The reasons for such deficiencies are manifold …

[PDF][PDF] Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences

H Aziz, P Biró, T Fleiner, S Gaspers, R Haan - 2017 - real.mtak.hu
We study a two-sided matching problem where the agents have independent pairwise
preferences on their possible partners and these preferences may be uncertain. In this case …