We explore the acquisition and flow of information in matching markets through a model of college admissions with endogenous costly information acquisition. We extend the notion of …
F Yucel, E Bulut - IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In opportunistic mobile crowdsensing, participants (workers) accept to carry out the requested sensing tasks only if they are already close to or within the regions of interest …
Online manufacturing platforms are spreading in the manufacturing industry in the shade of Cloud Manufacturing systems. The paper manipulates a matching mechanism for public …
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank …
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three …
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classical definition of stability by …
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their …
When dealing with real-world election data and preferences, it is often realistic to assume that the given data are incomplete or noisy. The reasons for such deficiencies are manifold …
We study a two-sided matching problem where the agents have independent pairwise preferences on their possible partners and these preferences may be uncertain. In this case …