Online stable task assignment in opportunistic mobile crowdsensing with uncertain trajectories

F Yucel, E Bulut - IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In opportunistic mobile crowdsensing, participants (workers) accept to carry out the
requested sensing tasks only if they are already close to or within the regions of interest …

Matchings under preferences: Strength of stability and tradeoffs

J Chen, P Skowron, M Sorge - ACM Transactions on Economics and …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near
stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classical definition of stability by …

An investigation of the recoverable robust assignment problem

D Fischer, TA Hartmann, S Lendl… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2020 - arxiv.org
We investigate the so-called recoverable robust assignment problem on balanced bipartite
graphs with $2 n $ vertices, a mainstream problem in robust optimization: For two given …

Theory of and experiments on minimally invasive stability preservation in changing two-sided matching markets

N Boehmer, K Heeger, R Niedermeier - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2022 - ojs.aaai.org
Following up on purely theoretical work, we contribute further theoretical insights into
adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical …

Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change

V Zech, N Boehmer, E Elkind, N Teh - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.11017, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over
candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are …

Stable roommates with narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences

R Bredereck, J Chen, UP Finnendahl… - Autonomous agents and …, 2020 - Springer
Abstract The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a
matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to …

Deepening the (parameterized) complexity analysis of incremental stable matching problems

N Boehmer, K Heeger, R Niedermeier - arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.01563, 2022 - arxiv.org
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents
in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change …

Target-based computer-assisted orchestration: Complexity and approximation algorithms

E Bampis, CE Cella, B Escoffier, M Rocco… - European Journal of …, 2023 - Elsevier
Target-based computer-assisted orchestration can be thought of as the process of searching
for combinations of orchestral sounds in a database of sound samples to match a given …

[HTML][HTML] Preference swaps for the stable matching problem

E Eiben, G Gutin, PR Neary, C Rambaud… - Theoretical Computer …, 2023 - Elsevier
An instance I of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a
preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in I is the exchange of two consecutive …

Maintaining stability for a matching problem under dynamic preference

A Alimudin, Y Ishida, K Suzuki - IEEE Access, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
This study investigates two-sided matching and considers dynamic preference. In a stable
matching problem, dynamic preference is a situation that often happens in real-world …