VI Preface methods from information theory. Unconditionally secure schemes are now
addressed in an extra chapter, Chapter 10.• Unconditional security is not achievable without …

Mix-nets are used in e-voting schemes and other applications that require anonymity.
Shuffles of homomorphic encryptions are often used in the construction of mix-nets. A shuffle …

Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment captures all major
developments in electronic voting since 2003 in a real-world setting. It covers three broad …

A proof of a shuffle is a zero-knowledge proof that one list of ciphertexts is a permutation and
re-encryption of another list of ciphertexts. We call a shuffle restricted if the permutation is …

We propose a new encryption primitive, commitment consistent encryption (CCE), and
instances of this primitive that enable building the first universally verifiable voting schemes …

Since David Chaum introduced the idea of mix nets 40 years ago, they have become widely
used building blocks for privacy-preserving protocols. Several important applications, such …

Numerous cryptographic applications require efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK) as a building block. Typically they rely on the Fiat-Shamir …

Coercion-resistance is a security property of electronic voting, often considered as a must-
have for high-stake elections. The JCJ voting scheme, proposed in 2005 by Juels, Catalano …

Verifiable mix nets, and specifically proofs of (correct) shuffle, are a fundamental building
block in numerous applications: these zero-knowledge proofs allow the prover to produce a …

We present Zeus, a verifiable internet ballot casting and counting system based on Helios, in
which encrypted votes are posted eponymously to a server, then are anonymized via …