Multiwinner voting: A new challenge for social choice theory

P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko… - … in computational social …, 2017 - books.google.com
There are many reasons why societies run elections. For example, a given society may need
to select its leader (eg, a president), members of a team may need to find an appropriate …

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

H Aziz, M Brill, V Conitzer, E Elkind, R Freeman… - Social Choice and …, 2017 - Springer
We consider approval-based committee voting, ie the setting where each voter approves a
subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners …

[PDF][PDF] Broadening the research agenda for computational social choice: Multiple preference profiles and multiple solutions

N Boehmer, R Niedermeier - Proceedings of the 20th …, 2021 - ifmas.csc.liv.ac.uk
The area of computational social choice (COMSOC) analyzes collective decision problems
from an algorithmic perspective. So far, the main focus in this area lied on analyzing …

Proportional justified representation

L Sánchez-Fernández, E Elkind, M Lackner… - Proceedings of the …, 2017 - ojs.aaai.org
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters'
preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters …

[HTML][HTML] Finding a collective set of items: From proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation

P Skowron, P Faliszewski, J Lang - Artificial Intelligence, 2016 - Elsevier
We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (eg, movies) and a group of
agents (eg, passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic utility for each of the …

[PDF][PDF] Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback

V Conitzer, R Freedman, J Heitzig… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - researchgate.net
Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic
behavior, so that, for example, they refuse to comply with requests for help with committing …

Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey

E Elkind, M Lackner, D Peters - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09092, 2022 - arxiv.org
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

Bridging machine learning and mechanism design towards algorithmic fairness

J Finocchiaro, R Maio, F Monachou, GK Patro… - Proceedings of the …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Decision-making systems increasingly orchestrate our world: how to intervene on the
algorithmic components to build fair and equitable systems is therefore a question of utmost …

[PDF][PDF] Computational aspects of multi-winner approval voting

H Aziz, S Gaspers, J Gudmundsson… - Workshops at the …, 2014 - cdn.aaai.org
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to
elect multiple winners. These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional approval …

Multiwinner voting with fairness constraints

LE Celis, L Huang, NK Vishnoi - arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.10057, 2017 - arxiv.org
Multiwinner voting rules are used to select a small representative subset of candidates or
items from a larger set given the preferences of voters. However, if candidates have …