I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in
successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also …

Third parties often have a stake in the outcome of a conflict and can affect that outcome by
taking sides. This article studies the factors that affect a third party's decision to take sides in …

When can diplomatic communication facilitate military cooperation? I analyze a formal
model in which states may form coalitions for war but are uncertain about a partner's …

We present a dynamic, complete-information bargaining model of war with N countries. The
analysis of a network with more than two countries significantly generalizes previous work …

In a war of attrition a player's perceived strength is the distribution describing beliefs about
her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of …

Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars
typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and …

We argue that the effective power of a coalition depends not only on its members' raw
capabilities, but also how much effort they exert. Free-riding and competition between …

By extending the extant costly-lottery models of dyadic war to three-party bargaining
scenarios, we offer rationalist explanations for two-front war, where a state at the center is …

In many ethnically segregated countries, policy is directly linked to ethnicity, and thus,
nonruling ethnic groups may suffer from the implemented policy. For these groups, a …

This dissertation is devoted to studying the role of military capability in deterrence. In
particular, each of its three papers focuses on a different aspect of how military preparations …