[PDF][PDF] Credit rationing in developing countries: an overview of the theory

P Ghosh, D Mookherjee, D Ray - Readings in the theory of economic …, 2000 - Citeseer
Credit is essential in poor rural economies in a variety of ways. It is required to finance
working capital and investment in fixed capital, particularly among farmers too poor to …

Competition and microfinance

C McIntosh, B Wydick - Journal of development economics, 2005 - Elsevier
Competition between microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries has increased
dramatically in the last decade. We model the behavior of non-profit lenders, and show that …

[HTML][HTML] Relief from usury: Impact of a self-help group lending program in rural India

V Hoffmann, V Rao, V Surendra, U Datta - Journal of Development …, 2021 - Elsevier
Provision of low-cost credit to the poor through self-help groups (SHGs) has been embraced
as a key poverty-reduction strategy in developing countries, but evidence on the impact of …

Competition in loan contracts

CA Parlour, U Rajan - American Economic Review, 2001 - aeaweb.org
We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan
contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more …

Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities

I Segal, MD Whinston - Econometrica, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each
agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show …

Moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

A Bisin, D Guaitoli - RAND Journal of Economics, 2004 - JSTOR
We study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents'
contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored (or …

Multiple bank lending, creditor rights, and information sharing

A Bennardo, M Pagano, S Piccolo - Review of finance, 2015 - academic.oup.com
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are
poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their …

The hazards of piecemeal reform: British civil courts and the credit market in colonial India

RE Kranton, AV Swamy - Journal of development Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
The colonial experience of developing countries provides valuable evidence regarding the
impact of legal and institutional innovations on economic growth. However, there has been …

The paradox of pledgeability

JR Donaldson, D Gromb, G Piacentino - Journal of Financial Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other
creditors. We find that, paradoxically, borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is …

Competition among exchanges

T Santos, JA Scheinkman - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001 - academic.oup.com
Does competition among financial intermediaries lead to excessively low standards? To
examine this question, we construct a model where intermediaries design contracts to attract …