C McIntosh, B Wydick - Journal of development economics, 2005 - Elsevier
Competition between microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries has increased dramatically in the last decade. We model the behavior of non-profit lenders, and show that …
Provision of low-cost credit to the poor through self-help groups (SHGs) has been embraced as a key poverty-reduction strategy in developing countries, but evidence on the impact of …
We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more …
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show …
We study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents' contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored (or …
A Bennardo, M Pagano, S Piccolo - Review of finance, 2015 - academic.oup.com
Multiple bank lending induces borrowers to take too much debt when creditor rights are poorly protected; moreover, banks wish to engage in opportunistic lending at their …
RE Kranton, AV Swamy - Journal of development Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
The colonial experience of developing countries provides valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and institutional innovations on economic growth. However, there has been …
We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors. We find that, paradoxically, borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is …
T Santos, JA Scheinkman - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001 - academic.oup.com
Does competition among financial intermediaries lead to excessively low standards? To examine this question, we construct a model where intermediaries design contracts to attract …