The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed‐bid first‐price auctions. For a given
symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest …

Consider a market with identical firms offering a homogeneous good. For any given ex ante
distribution of the price count (the number of firms from which a consumer obtains a quote) …

We study optimal information design in static contests where contestants do not know their
values of winning. The designer aims at maximizing the total expected effort. Before the …

This paper theoretically studies price discrimination based on search costs. Shoppers have
a zero and nonshoppers a positive search cost. A consumer faces a nondiscriminatory …

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with
independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about …

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest.
Before the contest, each player can spy on the opponent by privately acquiring a costly …

Two players compete for a prize in an all-pay auction where their private binary valuations
are independent from each other. A contest organizer commits to disclose additional …

We study all-pay auctions where each player observes her private value as well as a noisy
private signal about the opponent's value, following Fang and Morris's (J Econ Theory 126 …

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in static all-pay auctions. For the complete
information case of two bidders, all correlated equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash …