▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …

“A short review cannot convey the rich variety of arguments and data Bartels deploys in
making his case…. Bartels shows that social issues do not create as strong a headwind …

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …

As recently as the early 1970s, the news media was one of the most respected institutions in
the United States. Yet by the 1990s, this trust had all but evaporated. Why has confidence in …

This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning
inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary …

Does a government's fate at the ballot box hinge on the state of the economy? Is it inflation,
unemployment, or income that makes the difference? What triggers economic voting for or …

The recent game-theoretic macroeconomic literature provides a useful tool for analyzing the
relationship between political institutions and the macroeconomy. In particular, this paper …

This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and
national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between …

A formal model of electoral behavior is developed under the assumption that candidates
have policy preferences as well as an interest in winning per se. This model is shown to …

This paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the
US in the post-World War II period. The cycle described in this paper is different from the …