Financial intermediation

G Gorton, A Winton - Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 2003 - Elsevier
The savings/investment process in capitalist economies is organized around bank-like
financial intermediaries (“banks”), making them a central institution of economic growth …

Corruption, soundness of the banking sector, and economic growth: A cross-country study

J Park - Journal of international money and Finance, 2012 - Elsevier
This paper explores the impact of corruption on both the banking sector and economic
growth; we determine the impact using 76 macroeconomic data from various countries over …

Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago banking panic

CW Calomiris, J Mason - 1994 - nber.org
Studies of pre-Depression banking argue that banking panics resulted from depositor
confusion about the incidence of shocks, and that interbank cooperation avoided …

Deposit insurance, moral hazard and market monitoring

R Gropp, J Vesala - Review of Finance, 2004 - academic.oup.com
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring,
and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce …

Explaining bank failures: Deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency

DC Wheelock, PW Wilson - The review of economics and statistics, 1995 - JSTOR
This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure. For state-
chartered Kansas banks during 1910-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a …

The impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking

BC Esty - Journal of Financial Economics, 1998 - Elsevier
From 1863–1935, regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to
discourage risk taking. Using data from 1900 to 1915, I find that banks subject to stricter …

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk‐Taking, and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

CW Calomiris, M Jaremski - The Journal of Finance, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging
reckless behavior. Several US states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of …

Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings

VP Ioannidou, MF Penas - Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2010 - Elsevier
We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context
of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an …

The relationship between bank capital, risk-taking, and capital regulation: A review of the literature

S Stolz - 2002 - econstor.eu
Bank capital regulation seems to be today's most accepted regulatory instrument. The
reasoning is that limited liability and deposit insurance appear to give banks incentives for …

Why do banks fail? Evidence from the 1920s

LJ Alston, WA Grove, DC Wheelock - Explorations in Economic History, 1994 - Elsevier
This paper examines the causes of rural bank failures during the 1920s using a newly
created state-level data series. By focusing on rural banks we are able to investigate the …